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One of the most important factors in Western Europe'., economic and political 
recovery after the Second World War was confidence in the military strength and 
solidarity provided by NA 'fO. Because of this, investments and long-term programs 
were undertaken in an optimistic spirit. One danger of the current cutbacks in 
military expenditures and commitments on the part of the United States is that thi, 
spirit of confidence will be lost, with a resnlting dcterioriatio11 in stre11gth, growth, 
and solidarity. 
STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES 
OF 
ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE 
An address presented at the Naval War College 
by 
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr., U.S. Army 
It is a p!oasur(: to vi;iit the Nava1 War 
College and to have an opportunity to 
discuss some of the problems that arc 
facing my NATO command, Allied 
Command Ruropc, but, before I get iuto 
the main portlon of my remarkH on the 
"Strategy and Capabilities of Allied 
Command Rurope," I would like to 
discuSH briefly with you some of the 
atmosphcrici; which seem to surround 
the military services today. 
This b1i after all, a period of not only 
national, but international challenge and 
crillcism-somc of it weU founded, 
much of it decidedly not. I want to talk 
about this bceaw'.le it is part of the 
background of one of NATO's key 
problcmH toduy�thc support of essen­
tial military undcrtakinh"'· 
Challenges and ;;carehillg probes cun 
be of great value, for intelligent exami­
nation ii; a ncccstlily if souud, up-to-datt.� 
solutions are to he reached. Indeed, 
such examination is the very purpose of 
your attendance here at the college. But 
in much of whut we see today there is 
often a destructive clement at work and 
sometimci; a motive of self-interest. One 
of the firet targets seems to be the 
institutions connected with the so-called 
H establishment. n The military services 
and their members find themselves 
being as .. ilcd. There is nothing new to 
this in our democratic societies, of 
course; we have had echoes of it many 
times over the years. I tend to regard it, 
in a phrase of General Eiscnhowerls, as 
one of "Joh'!i boils,,-one more burden 
or harassment that we as military men 
must and can bear as part of our 
commitment to serving our country and 
its national 8Ccurity. When the questions 
arc loaded and tlrn charges arc the 
opposite of the trutlt 1 the contribution 
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